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INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, the Supreme Court upheld an antitrust action brought by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) against a group of trial lawyers from a panel of 
court-appointed attorneys for indigent criminal defendants in the District of Co-
lumbia (DC).1 The FTC sued the trial lawyers’ organization and its leadership 
because the lawyers collectively refused to take more criminal defense assign-
ments.2 The refusal was in protest of fees that were so low that the lawyers be-
lieved they were compromising their clients’ Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.3 The lawyers’ boycott successfully induced the DC 
municipal government to enact legislation raising the hourly rate for court-
appointed criminal defense cases.4 
If the trial lawyers’ action sounds like a strike, that is because it was a 
strike. Except that unlike myself, and my fellow employees at The Legal Aid 
Society in New York, the lawyers were each independent practitioners, em-
ployed by themselves.5 Because of that distinction, those lawyers lost the statu-
tory protections for collective labor actions in the Clayton Antitrust Act,6 the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act,7 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).8 As 
statutory “independent contractors,” their collective action was not only subject 
to the prohibitions of antitrust law, but, as the Supreme Court held, it was 
deemed a per se violation of the antitrust rule against price fixing.9 Therefore, 
the FTC did not have to prove market impact to obtain a finding of liability.10 
The collective worker protest was unlawful in and of itself, regardless of the 
consequences to the government, other attorneys in that area of practice, or 
their clients. 
The Court’s decision in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers’ Association 
(SCTLA), authored by Justice Stevens, is problematic for a number of reasons, 
especially its application of antitrust law to a labor action and its treatment of 
                                                        
1  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA), 493 U.S. 411, 436 
(1990). 
2  Id. at 416–19. 
3  See id. at 414–16; Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n at 4–5, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 
(1990) (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393), 1989 WL 1126841. 
4  Id. at 418. 
5  The Legal Aid Society is a private not-for-profit law firm that serves, inter alia, as the pri-
mary provider of representation to indigent criminal defendants in New York City. See 
Criminal Defense Practice, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, https://www.legalaidnyc.org/criminal (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6LSN-6QZA]. The Association of Legal Aid Attor-
neys, the union of attorneys at the Legal Aid Society, of which the author is a member, has 
conducted several strikes over the years under the protection of the NLRA. The most recent 
strike took place in 1994, four years after the decision in the SCTLA case. 
6  15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2012). 
7  29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2012). 
8  Id. §§ 151–69. 
9  See SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 428–32. 
10  See id. 
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the First Amendment.11 In particular, the decision purports to distinguish 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,12 also written by Justice Stevens, on the 
grounds that the boycott in the NAACP case was selflessly aimed at helping 
others, while the boycott by the trial lawyers was to obtain higher fees for 
themselves. That supposed distinction fails to acknowledge that the civil rights 
boycotters in Claiborne, Mississippi, were seeking to advance their own eco-
nomic opportunities, or that the boycotting lawyers were seeking to vindicate 
the constitutional rights of their clients. 
In addition, since the DC municipal government was fixing the prices at is-
sues, i.e., the attorneys’ fees, one might ask how the lawyers’ collective action 
was truly anti-competitive in a market sense. In particular, since the criminal 
defendants for whom the government was purchasing the service had no market 
power, the market allowed the government to set pay at a level that sufficient 
numbers of lawyers in the market for government-paid work might accept, 
without any market guarantee that the lawyers would necessarily provide their 
clients with constitutionally-adequate service. The market of lawyers looking 
for government-paid work had no capacity to correct that problem. 
I will return to both of those points later,13 but I want to examine another 
justification that the Court offered: that while petitioning the government to fix 
prices is constitutionally protected under the Noerr doctrine,14 boycotting as a 
means of seeking better pay is itself unlawful for independent contractors, and, 
therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. In other words, for workers 
who are not deemed employees under labor law, collectively withholding labor 
to obtain better pay rates is an unlawful action per se under antitrust law, and 
therefore is not a protected form of expression under the First Amendment. 
Scholars have addressed why this reasoning is problematic under antitrust law 
and the First Amendment.15 But the Court’s reasoning is even more problemat-
ic under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
This article focuses on how the Court’s prohibition against the collective 
refusal to provide labor can be squared with the Thirteenth Amendment’s pro-
hibition against involuntary servitude. Specifically, the Supreme Court has re-
                                                        
11  See Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collec-
tive Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 1043 (2016). 
12  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 906 (1982) [hereinafter NAACP]. 
13  See infra Part V. 
14  E. R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 145 (1961); see also Unit-
ed Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 667 (1965). 
15  See Paul, supra note 11, at 1043–48. The SCTLA Court’s reasoning is reminiscent of the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 
U.S. 490, 504 (1949), in which the Court upheld the use of state antitrust law to prohibit un-
ion picketing of wholesalers to induce them not to sell to nonunion retailers. The Court held 
that the First Amendment did not protect methods of expressive action that were violative of 
generally-applicable laws. Id. at 495. Giboney became the cornerstone of the Court’s retreat 
from First Amendment protection of labor picketing. See Richard Blum, Labor Picketing, 
the Right to Protest, and the Neoliberal First Amendment, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. 
CHANGE 595, 604 (2019). 
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peatedly ruled that quitting one’s job is protected under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.16 In addition, the Court has indicated that in the context of strikes, 
abandoning work individually or collectively is protected under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.17 The principle is that a system of free labor requires that workers, 
whether acting alone or collectively, have the capacity to leave their jobs to 
create pressure on employers to respond to workers’ complaints, needs, and 
demands. Not having the capacity to abandon a job leaves workers with no 
power to prevent the type of exploitation that is constitutionally constitutive of 
involuntary servitude.18 
The core argument of this article is that if leaving a job due to unsatisfacto-
ry working conditions is protected, then deciding not to take the job in the first 
place must also be protected. If workers leaving a job collectively are protected, 
then workers collectively refusing to take jobs, the key constitutive act of a la-
bor boycott by independent contractors, should also be protected. Since inde-
pendent contractors are not understood as having employment, each job they 
undertake, even if it is for the same purchaser of labor, e.g., the government, is 
a new job. Thus, for independent contractors, a strike or boycott will normally 
take the form of refusing new job assignments, just as it did in the SCTLA case. 
In the context of what is deemed employment, it would obviously violate 
the Thirteenth Amendment to declare it illegal, even criminal, for someone to 
reject a job offer. Enjoining a job applicant to accept the job or imposing fines 
or other penalties for turning it down would not be permitted by the Constitu-
tion. I do not know of any case vindicating the right to reject a job outside the 
immigration detention system, perhaps because the point is so obvious.19 But 
this principle has deep Thirteenth Amendment roots in the striking down of an-
ti-vagrancy laws used to try to re-enslave black workers in the aftermath of the 
Civil War and the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment and in the collective 
protests of newly-freed black workers in the Deep South during the same time 
period. I argue here that the refusal of labor should be protected regardless of 
one’s statutory status as an employee or prospective employee. 
This article argues that what antitrust law calls an unlawful boycott of a 
buyer of labor can actually constitute constitutionally-protected activity under 
the Thirteenth Amendment, if the people engaging in the boycott are selling 
their own labor. These Thirteenth Amendment arguments to protect labor boy-
cotts, regardless of statutory status, were not argued or addressed in the SCTLA 
                                                        
16  Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 7–8 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227 
(1911). 
17  Int’l Union v. Wisconsin Emp’t Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 251 (1949), overruled on 
other grounds by Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp’t Relations 
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
18  See infra Parts III, V. 
19  See, e.g., Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1131–33 (D. Colo. 2015) 
(denying motion to dismiss forced labor claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
against owner-operator of immigrant detention facility that allegedly required detainees to 
clean living areas under threat of solitary confinement). 
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decision.20 However, they do implicate the Court’s reasoning in a number of 
ways set forth below. 
Part I of this article provides the context for the SCTLA decision by analyz-
ing the decisional law that had developed prior to that case concerning the in-
tersections of antitrust and labor law since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act and the NLRA. Part II places the issue of independent contractor collective 
action in the context of today’s disputes over classifying workers as employees 
or independent contractors, and the legal implications of such classification, 
with special focus on the gig economy and drivers. Part III argues for a right to 
refuse work, both individually and collectively, as grounded in the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Part IV takes a close look at the competing arguments in the 
SCTLA case to highlight the differences between a pure First Amendment de-
fense of boycotting and a Thirteenth Amendment approach. Finally, Part V of-
fers a critique of the SCTLA decision in light of the Thirteenth Amendment 
right to boycott. 
I. THE COLLISION OF ANTITRUST LAW AND LABOR LAW BEFORE THE SCTLA 
DECISION 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 declared combinations and conspira-
cies in restraint of interstate or foreign trade to be illegal.21 In 1914, Congress 
enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act to both limit and extend the Sherman Act.22 
Of significance here, the Clayton Antitrust Act clarified that labor organiza-
tions are to be exempt from antitrust laws.23 However, the Supreme Court hon-
                                                        
20  See infra Part IV. 
21  Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). Violations of antitrust law are deemed a 
felony, punishable with fines up to $100,000,000 for a corporation and $1,000,000 for any 
other person, and/or with prison for up to 10 years. Id. §§ 1–3. Federal district courts have 
jurisdiction to issue equitable relief to prevent and restrain violations. Id. § 4. Treble damag-
es for violations of antitrust law are also available. Id. § 15. The antitrust law also establishes 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and empowers it to enforce the antitrust laws. Id. 
§§ 41-58. That subchapter declares unfair competition in or affecting commerce to be unlaw-
ful, id. § 45(a)(1), and gives the FTC the authority to investigate violations and to prevent 
persons, partnerships, and corporations from engaging in unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce. Id. § 45(a)(2). The FTC may issue complaints and, after hearings, cease 
and desist orders, id. § 45(b), which can be appealed to a United States court of appeals and 
to the Supreme Court. Id. § 45(c)–(k). When applied to worker boycotts, all of these sanc-
tions are problematic under a Thirteenth-Amendment analysis, because they render constitu-
tionally-protected activity unlawful and they are all intended to prevent and restrain workers 
from engaging in that activity. Other remedies for withholding labor under other laws, such 
as compensatory damages for breach of contract, lie beyond the scope of this article. 
22  Id. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2012). 
23  15 U.S.C. § 17 reads: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the 
antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or 
horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital 
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations, 
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the 
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ored that exemption more in the breach than in the observance.24 Consequently, 
Congress, in enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act, stripped federal courts of ju-
risdiction to enjoin activities arising from labor disputes.25 In turn, the NLRA 
declared concerted activity by workers covered by the Act to be protected.26  
In a series of decisions in the 1940s, the Supreme Court set forth the basic 
rules for applying the labor protections of the Clayton Act, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, and the NLRA to antitrust claims against labor unions. In Apex 
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, the Court struck down antitrust claims against a union 
for engaging in a sit-down strike.27 The Court noted that the union was not be-
ing used by the industry to suppress competition or fix prices.28 Rather, the un-
ion was seeking to compel the employer to accede to its labor demands by re-
moving the employer’s product from interstate commerce during the strike.29 
The Court concluded that the Sherman Act was not intended to reach every lo-
cal factory strike stopping production and shipment of a product interstate.30 
Otherwise, practically every strike would bring within federal jurisdiction what 
are merely possible violations of local laws in the conduct of the strike.31 Thus, 
the fact that the strike at issue involved violence did not bring it within the pro-
hibitions of the antitrust law.32 
In United States v. Hutcheson,33 the Court rejected criminal antitrust charg-
es against a union president whose union struck a business over a jurisdictional 
dispute with another union. Relying on the Norris-LaGuardia Act,34 the Court 
                                                                                                                                
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of 
trade, under the antitrust laws. 
15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). 
This explicit exemption for labor organizations in the Clayton Act came in response to Su-
preme Court decisions applying the Sherman Act to union activity. See, e.g., Gompers v. 
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445 (1911); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308 
(1908). 
24  See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 483–84 (1921). 
25  29 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
26  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
27  Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
28  See id. at 501. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. at 512. 
31  Id. at 513. 
32  See id.; see also Milk Wagon Driver’s Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 
91 (1940) (applying the Norris-LaGuardia Act to deny federal court jurisdiction to issue in-
junction against action of union in labor dispute); New Negro All. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 
303 U.S. 552 (1938). 
33  United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). For an analysis of the significance of 
the Apex Hosiery decision, see Paul, supra note 11, at 1024–27. 
34  Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 227. The Court noted in passing and without explanation that 
“Concededly an injunction either at the suit of the Government or of the employer could not 
issue.” Id. Presumably, this concession is due to the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s removal of fed-
eral court jurisdiction to issue such injunctions. See 29 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). For a critique of 
this move to rely exclusively on the Norris-LaGuardia Act and not on an interpretation of the 
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ruled that the use of “conventional, peaceful activities by a union in controver-
sy with a rival union over certain jobs” did not constitute a violation of the anti-
trust laws.35 The Hutcheson Court set forth these basic principles in applying 
labor protections to antitrust claims: “So long as a union acts in its self-interest 
and does not combine with non-labor groups,” it has not violated the antitrust 
laws.36 
The Supreme Court next applied the labor exemption to protect workers’ 
rights to collectively refuse work. In Hunt v. Crumboch,37 the Court held that 
“[i]t is not a violation of the Sherman Act for laborers in combination to refuse 
to work. They can sell or not sell their labor as they please, and upon such 
terms and conditions as they choose, without infringing the Anti-trust laws.”38 
A union had refused to provide workers to an employer that it blamed for kill-
ing a union member.39 Citing the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 
the Court made it clear that: 
A worker is privileged under congressional enactments, acting either alone or in 
concert with his fellow workers, to associate or to decline to associate with other 
workers, to accept, refuse to accept, or to terminate a relationship of employ-
ment, and his labor is not to be treated as “a commodity or article of com-
merce.”40 
Thus, workers are insulated from antitrust liability, even when collectively re-
fusing to accept work from a given employer, if their actions are protected by 
the labor laws. 
In applying labor law protections to antitrust law, the Court distinguished 
between labor disputes involving employees from those involving independent 
contractors. In Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton,41 the Court withheld 
labor law protections from a union of fishermen who refused to sell fish to non-
union canneries, because the fishermen were independent contractors and not 
                                                                                                                                
Sherman Act itself, and of the implications of that move, see Paul, supra note 11, at 1027–
33. 
35  Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 227. 
36  Id. at 232. Unions lose their immunity from antitrust law when they “aid nonlabor groups 
to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services.” Allen 
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945). In short, unions are protected only when 
engaged in what the Court would recognize as a proper labor dispute and not in collusion 
with an employer or group of employers to enhance their competitive standing for reasons 
not directly related to claims concerning the terms and conditions of employment. So, a un-
ion cannot serve as a stalking horse for an employer in knocking out competition for the sake 
of profit. Although this principle derives directly from the language of the labor laws, it also 
resonates with the distinction set forth in the Clayton Act between labor and commodities. 
When a union is acting to advance traditional labor interests, its actions are exempt from an-
titrust prohibitions, but when a union is acting as a player in the market for commodities, it 
loses its protections. 
37  Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 US. 821 (1945). 
38  Id. at 824 (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 502–03 (1940)). 
39  Id. 
40  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012)). 
41  Columbia River Packers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942). 
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employees of anyone.42 The Court acknowledged that an employer-employee 
relationship is not required for workers to enjoy the labor antitrust exemption.43 
For example, the labor dispute could concern an employer’s refusal to hire a set 
of workers.44 But, the statutory term “labor dispute” does not protect “contro-
versies upon which the employer-employee relationship has no bearing.”45 As a 
matter of statutory construction, independent contractors under labor law were 
left subject to the prohibitions of the antitrust laws when they joined together to 
engage in collective bargaining and to protect the standards that they bargain 
for.46 Thus, the Court resolved the tension between antitrust law and labor law 
by reading the labor laws as creating statutory exemptions from the antitrust 
law. 
Sanjukta Paul has argued that by exempting those protected by labor stat-
utes, the Court did not reject its earlier understanding that the antitrust law ap-
plies to collective worker action.47 As a result, workers not covered by the labor 
laws remained unprotected when engaging in collective action to advance their 
interests as workers. Moreover, relying on statutory interpretation alone, none 
of these decisions applying labor law to antitrust law addressed whether the 
Thirteenth Amendment itself ever protects the collective withholding of labor, 
including the refusal to accept work. 
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE: THE FISSURED WORKPLACE AND THE GIG 
ECONOMY 
A. Employees v. Independent Contractors: Statutory Lines and Their 
Consequences 
The Supreme Court’s decision to define the labor exemption from antitrust 
law according to coverage under the nation’s principal labor statutes, has seri-
ous implications for today’s workers. Employers often deem workers to be “in-
dependent contractors,” rather than employees of the entities that set the terms 
and conditions of their labor.48 Courts must frequently adjudicate whether 
                                                        
42  Id. at 145–46. The decision’s reliance on the fact that the fishermen were engaged in sell-
ing a product, fish, could have allowed the Court to distinguish this case as one concerning a 
commodity and not labor. But the Court did not take that bait. 
43  Id. at 146. 
44  See id. at 145. 
45  Id. 
46  The circuit courts of appeals have applied this principle on various occasions to people 
selling their own labor. See, e.g., San Juan Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Asociacion de Jinetes de 
Puerto Rico, Inc., 590 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1979) (applying to jockeys); Conley Motor Express, 
Inc. v. Russell, 500 F.2d 124 (3rd Cir. 1974) (applying to steel haulers); Taylor v. Local 7, 
Int’l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965) (applying to horsesho-
ers). 
47  Paul, supra note 11, at 1027. 
48  See generally Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. La-
bor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 
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workers are misclassified as independent contractors under any of a variety of 
federal and state labor laws, including the NLRA.49 The stakes in these disputes 
are high, particularly when NLRA coverage is at issue.50 As discussed above, if 
workers are found not to be employees under the NLRA, their collective activi-
ties not only lose the protection of the NLRA, but also become subject to the 
strictures of antitrust law. 
Yet, significant disputes have arisen on how to determine employee status 
under the NLRA, which applies common law agency principles.51 For example, 
the DC Circuit recently reaffirmed its previous rejection of the National Labor 
Relations Board’s (NLRB) approach to evaluating employee status under the 
NLRA.52 That dispute centers on whether entrepreneurial opportunity should be 
the focus of the inquiry.53 More recently, the Board overruled its FedEx deci-
                                                                                                                                
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187 (1999); Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: Fed-
Ex Drivers and the Work Contract as Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083 
(2015); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor Prob-
lem Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279 (2011). 
49  See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (applying common 
law principles to determine if insurance agent was an employee under ERISA); NLRB v. 
United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968) (applying common law agency test to determine em-
ployee status under the NLRA); see generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, 
THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT ch. 27.III.C.2.e (7th ed. 2017) (re-
viewing cases determining employee versus independent contractor status under the NLRA). 
50  The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) defines “employ” to include “to suffer or permit to 
work,” using a much broader standard to determine if someone is an employee under wage 
and hour laws and other provisions of that act. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012); see also United 
States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945). The recent California Supreme Court 
decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty., provided that un-
der California’s wage orders, a worker can only be deemed an independent contractor if the 
company can demonstrate:  
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the [hiring entity in the performance 
of the work]; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring en-
tity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity. 
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty., 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018). 
However, this approach to state wage laws is distinct from the test adopted by the NLRB or 
courts applying the NLRA. 
51  See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968). 
52  FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (confirming the ap-
proach taken in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB., 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (FedEx 1), 
which focused the common law determination of employee versus independent contractor 
status on entrepreneurial opportunity and rejecting the NLRB’s approach in FedEx Home 
Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 55 (2014), which equally considered all common law factors). 
53  The factors to be considered under the common law can be found in the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 220: 
In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the fol-
lowing matters of fact, among others, are considered: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the 
work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
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sion, holding that that decision overemphasized the right to control factors re-
lating to economic dependence and diminished the significance of entrepre-
neurial opportunity.54 As a consequence of such disputes and the resulting un-
certainty, without engaging in lengthy and costly litigation, workers may not 
know if their collective actions are protected by labor law or prohibited by anti-
trust law. 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of independent contractors under antitrust 
law holds particular significance in today’s fissured workplace.55 Through 
methods such as subcontracting,56 franchising,57 and spinning off segments of 
supply chains,58 many businesses have, over the last decades, externalized as-
pects of their operations that they consider to lie outside their core functions. In 
doing so, these businesses have distanced themselves from the workforce that 
once clearly consisted of direct employees. In some instances, businesses have 
structured or restructured their relationships with workers to classify or reclas-
sify them as independent contractors and not employees, allowing them to 
avoid responsibility or liability under labor laws. For example, FedEx treats the 
drivers who deliver for the company as independent contractors.59 As business-
                                                                                                                                
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done 
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of 
work for the person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in the business. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). In addition, the Board has 
stated that it considers, “as one factor among the others, whether putative contractors have 
‘significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’ ” FedEx Home Delivery, 361 
N.L.R.B. 55 at 612 (2014). Related to that question, “the Board has assessed whether pur-
ported contractors have the ability to work for other companies, can hire their own employ-
ees, and have a proprietary interest in their work.” Id. (citations omitted). 
54  SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 75, 7–12 (2019). 
55  See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR 
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). 
56  Id. at 99–121. 
57  Id. at 122–58. 
58  Id. at 159–77. 
59  Id. at 161–62. As noted above, this classification has been the subject of an ongoing dis-
pute between the company, on the one hand, and the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) and drivers in various parts of the country, on the other. Compare FedEx Home De-
livery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2017), with Craig v. FedEx Ground Package 
System, Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 72 (Kan. 2014) (rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s approach in FedEx I 
and finding FedEx drivers to be employees under state wage statute using common law 
right-to-control analysis), Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. 765 F.3d 1033 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (finding FedEx drivers to be employees under both the right-to-control and eco-
nomic-realities tests), and Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 997 
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es have restructured their relationships with their workforces to externalize re-
sponsibility for labor conditions and avoid labor laws, a range of low-wage 
workers have been deemed to be independent contractors. Sometimes, these in-
dependent contractors work directly for the principal business and sometimes 
they work through a labor subcontractor—generally under worse (and often un-
lawful) conditions than employees. Examples include supermarket delivery 
workers,60 taxi drivers,61 and port truck drivers.62 
In some instances, workers have not challenged their classification as inde-
pendent contractors, but have engaged in collective protest nonetheless. For ex-
ample, yellow-cab drivers in New York City, whose rates are set by a city 
agency, have been deemed independent contractors. The New York Taxi 
Workers’ Alliance (NYTWA), whose national body is an affiliate of the inter-
national AFL-CIO,63 has, in the past, organized strikes by yellow cab drivers in 
New York City to put pressure on the municipal agency that sets rates and 
closely regulates the industry.64 
At the same time, there is considerable ongoing litigation over the correct 
labor-law classification of drivers who receive their jobs through franchises and 
marketplace applications,65 such as Uber and Lyft drivers.66 Without waiting 
                                                                                                                                
(9th Cir. 2014) (finding FedEx drivers to be employees under state wage statutes applying 
common law right-to-control analysis). For a catalog of cases concerning the employee or 
independent contractor status of FedEx drivers, see Tomassetti, supra note 48, at 1089, n.26–
29. 
60  IMMANUEL NESS, IMMIGRANTS, UNIONS, AND THE NEW U.S. LABOR MARKET 102–10 
(2005). 
61  Id. at 140–41. 
62  RUTH MILKMAN, L.A. STORY: IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. LABOR 
MOVEMENT 177–78 (2006). Recently, port truck drivers and warehouse workers struck in 
Los Angeles and Long Beach to protest their classification as independent contractors. See 
Samantha Masunaga, L.A. and Long Beach Port Truckers and Warehouse Workers Begin 
Strike, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-port-truc 
kers-strike-20181001-story.html [https://perma.cc/3YQL-TSQ5]. Home health aides have 
also been treated as independent contractors. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR 
AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 132–33 (2012). 
However, both aggressive labor political activism and the situation of these workers in the 
welfare state have resulted in many states deeming them to be employees, whether of private 
agencies, the state itself, and/or consumers. Id. at 133–34, 141–42, 166, 194–95. 
63  See Mission & History, N.Y. TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://www.nytwa.org/mission-an 
d-history/ [https://perma.cc/6TEF-WFQL] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (chronicling history of 
the New York Taxi Workers Alliance and its charter to build the National Taxi Worker Alli-
ance, the first AFL-CIO charter for a union of independent contractors). 
64  See Victories: A Few Brief Highlights, N.Y. TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://www.nytw 
a.org/victories/ [https://perma.cc/VKU2-ANE7] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) (providing chro-
nology of activities, including two strikes against municipal agency rules). 
65  See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 149 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding 
that black drivers who received their work through a particular franchisor were independent 
contractors under the FLSA); see also Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1093 
(N.D. Ca. 2018) (finding that a Grubhub delivery driver is an independent contractor under 
California wage law); but see Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty., 
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for those questions to be resolved, the City of Seattle enacted legislation to al-
low drivers who obtain their work through these companies to collectively bar-
gain without running afoul of antitrust law.67 However, the Chamber of Com-
merce has successfully stopped the law from being implemented on the 
grounds that it does not fall within the exception to antitrust law for anti-
competitive actions by states to further the public interest.68 As perverse as it 
may seem, without the protections of the city law, Uber drivers would be at risk 
of antitrust prosecution if they attempted to act collectively to pressure Uber to 
improve the terms and conditions of their work,69 and they were adjudicated 
not to be employees of Uber under the NLRA.70 
Despite the high stakes involved, the unsettled state of these disputes over 
statutory lines leaves both businesses and workers unsure of their rights under 
both labor and antitrust law. Yet, in all of these examples, the individual seller 
of labor has little or no bargaining power against the entities that purchase or 
regulate their labor, regardless of how labor law classifies them.71 However, as 
                                                                                                                                
416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018) (establishing different test for determining employee status under 
California wage laws). 
66  See, e.g., N.Y. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (No. 596722) (July 12, 2018); see 
also Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Answer Will Shape the Sharing 
Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/ 
2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-will-shape-the-sharing-economy/#552bc 
0cd5e55 [https://perma.cc/7NLR-RPFV]; Megan Geuss, Uber Drivers are Employees, Cali-
fornia Labor Commission Ruling Suggests, ARS TECHNICA (June 17, 2015, 12:55 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/06/uber-drivers-are-employees-califor 
nia-labor-commission-rules/ [https://perma.cc/E8X8-EFE4]; Dan Rivoli, N.Y. Judge Grants 
Uber Drivers Employee Status, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 13, 2017), http://www.nydailynews 
.com/new-york/n-y-judge-grants-uber-drivers-employee-status-article-1.3245310 [https://per 
ma.cc/3SGB-CYPZ]. 
67  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (holding that federal-antitrust law does not 
prohibit states from legislating arrangements in the public interest that would otherwise vio-
late antitrust law if established by private contract, combination, or conspiracy). 
68  See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 795 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
69  See generally Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox 
and its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233 (2017) (accusing Uber of trying to 
use antitrust law against collective bargaining to create a reverse hiring hall, one in which the 
company can set standards for its benefits, but the workers cannot do so). 
70  See generally Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor 
Laws for Twenty-First Century Work: The “Independent Worker,” HAMILTON PROJECT (Dec. 
2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_firs 
t_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHS6-DFB3]. Harris and Krueger 
have proposed a new legal category, independent worker, to capture what they describe as 
the triangular relationship among gig economy workers, their customers (passengers, for ex-
ample), and the “intermediaries” who connect them (Uber or Lyft, for example). The authors 
cite antitrust law protection for collective action as one motivation for creating this third cat-
egory. 
71  My argument here is not directed at where the statutory line should be drawn, though I 
would favor a much more expansive standard for employee status than the DC Circuit. The 
argument here is that, no matter where Congress, the courts, and the Board draw the relevant 
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discussed below, under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress and the courts’ 
choices as to where to draw the contours of the employment relationship for 
various labor laws with various purposes, histories, and compromises, should 
not strip workers of all protections if they find themselves on the outside of the 
line. In particular, I argue that those congressional policy choices should not, 
under the Thirteenth Amendment, leave workers whose work relationships fall 
on the outside of any labor or employment law without the right to withhold 
their labor collectively to improve their working conditions. 
B. Labor Boycotts Outside the Protections of the NLRA 
Labor boycotts that are outside the coverage of the NLRA might arise in 
several contexts. In the SCTLA case, the purchaser of labor was the DC gov-
ernment. The government also set the fees for the people selling their labor. In 
other words, the government was acting both as a purchaser of labor and as 
regulator of labor terms. 
In contrast, with the striking tax workers in New York City, the govern-
ment was serving a purely regulatory function, but that regulatory function en-
tirely circumscribed the terms and conditions under which the drivers could sell 
their labor.72 In the case of FedEx or Uber or Lyft drivers, a boycott would be 
against a private company that is setting rates. With Uber and Lyft, as with oth-
er marketplace apps, vast numbers of individual workers with little or no bar-
gaining power receive work assignments from a private company that circum-
scribes the terms and conditions of the sale of the workers’ labor. Together, the 
two companies have almost total control of the online marketplace for driving 
services in many geographic areas around the country and beyond, and they 
                                                                                                                                
lines, workers who are selling their own labor have a Thirteenth Amendment right to with-
hold that labor collectively to enhance their bargaining power against the purchasers of their 
labor. 
72  The New York Taxi Worker’s Alliance (NYTWA)’s most recent strike deviated from that 
model. Eli Blumenthal, The Scene at JFK as Taxi Drivers Strike Following Trump’s Immi-
gration Ban, USA TODAY (Jan. 28, 2017, 8:15 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2 
017/01/28/taxi-drivers-strike-jfk-airport-following-trumps-immigration-ban/97198818/ [http 
s://perma.cc/8P4A-HJAG]. On the day that the president implemented his first executive or-
der banning migrants from a number of predominantly Muslim nations, the NYTWA staged 
a strike, refusing to provide service to JFK airport, where people were being detained. Id. 
Indeed, Uber caught flack for offering to provide substitute service, leading to a consumer 
boycott of Uber. Ashley Lutz, Furious Customers are Deleting the Uber App After Drivers 
Went to JFK Airport During a Protest and Strike, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2017, 11:38 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/delete-uber-hashtag-jfk-airport-taxi-strikes-2017-1 [https:// 
perma.cc/8WBB-2XG8]. Under Supreme Court precedent, however, it is unclear that even 
this overtly political boycott would necessarily enjoy First Amendment protection. See Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 218 (1982). But see Seth Kupfer-
berg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685, 729 (1985). 
That said, a political protest boycott would not normally implicate antitrust laws. 
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have the power to dictate the range of terms and conditions of work to their 
drivers, subject to any state regulation.73 
These cases serve to illustrate the significance of stripping independent 
contractors of their right to collectively withhold their labor to improve the 
terms and conditions on which they sell their labor. In all of these cases, a 
group of individual or small-scale sellers of their own labor are facing purchas-
ers who can dictate unilaterally the terms and conditions of the labor being 
sold. Individually, they lack the power to effectively pressure the purchasers of 
their labor to meet their needs adequately as workers. Yet, in all of these cases, 
the workers lack statutory protection from labor law and run afoul of antitrust 
law if they act collectively to affect the purchaser’s rates or other terms74 since, 
according to the Supreme Court, collectively refusing to provide labor consti-
tutes a violation of antitrust law.75 
When people who are selling their own labor collectively refuse to provide 
it to the government as purchaser or regulator or to private corporations, some 
of which may control the terms and conditions of the entire relevant labor mar-
ket,76 they are deploying their most effective tool to protect against exploita-
                                                        
73  See Adam Santariano, Uber Regains its License to Operate in London, a Win for its New 
C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/technology/uber-
london.html [https://perma.cc/AJG3-5X98]; see also Shirin Ghaffary, New York City Has Set 
the Nation’s First Minimum Pay Rate for Uber and Lyft Drivers, RECODE (Dec. 4, 2018, 
2:36 PM), https://www.recode.net/2018/12/4/18125789/uber-lyft-drivers-wage-minimum-ne 
w-york [https://perma.cc/6N38-4268]; Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap as New 
York City Takes Lead in Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/08/08/nyregion/uber-vote-city-council-cap.html [https://perma.cc/8SJY-GMM7]. 
74  Paul, supra note 11, at 991. Sanjukta Paul has argued that antitrust law was never intend-
ed to be applied to collective worker action. Others have argued that the scope of the anti-
trust labor exemption should be expanded. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Samuel 
Estreicher in Support of Defendants-Appellees., Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 
890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-35640); Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: 
The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543 (2018); 
see also Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small 
Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 
195, 240 (2001) (arguing for the need for different treatment under antitrust law of actors 
with limited market power). However, my argument is not based on the antitrust laws or an-
titrust principles. I am arguing that constitutionally, workers of whatever statutory category, 
are entitled to deploy the weapon of withholding their own labor to improve their bargaining 
power, regardless of arguments concerning market values. This argument is independent of, 
and may at times be hostile to, market values because it insists that labor is not to be treated 
as just another commodity under the Thirteenth Amendment. See infra, Section V.B. 
75  Paul, supra note 11, at 1010–11. 
76  A recent study of the United States labor market concluded that “most labor markets (as 
defined by occupation and geography) are very concentrated, and that that [sic] concentra-
tion has a robust negative impact on posted wages for job openings.” Marshall Steinbaum, 
How Widespread is Labor Monopsony? Some New Results Suggest It’s Pervasive, 
ROOSEVELT INST. (Dec. 18, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/how-widespread-labor-monop 
sony-some-new-results-suggest-its-pervasive/ [https://perma.cc/8JAZ-4KPS]. At the same 
time, a recent study argues that notwithstanding the importance of employer concentration 
on wage suppression, the “erosion of worker-side power is the dominant factor in the power 
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tion. Without the ability to refuse their labor, these workers would be at the 
mercy of the rate setters. They would have no market power to affect those 
rates themselves. 
The collective action of the trial lawyers did yield fee rates that gained 
them more money, and improved their ability to provide the service that the 
government was obligated to provide to indigent criminal defendants.77 In con-
trast, a recent suicide note by an Uber driver in New York City describes the 
pervasive exploitation in that industry.78 Recent studies of the take-home pay of 
Uber drivers after expenses also highlight the exploitation in this form of labor 
exchange.79 
Of course, each driver has the legal right to quit, and many Uber drivers 
have exercised that right.80 But debts incurred to become a driver make exit dif-
ficult for many.81 More important, the ability to exit in a market with an enor-
mous supply of labor has allowed the harsh conditions of work described in the 
suicide note to remain in place. The right to refuse work collectively, that is, to 
boycott or strike, is critical to these and other independent contractor workers 
obtaining improvements for themselves and for others. 
III. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO WITHHOLD LABOR 
In 1911, the Supreme Court in Bailey v. Alabama82 struck down a statute 
that enabled the state to prosecute a worker who accepted an advance from an 
                                                                                                                                
imbalance in the labor market.” Josh Bivens & Heidi Shierholz, What Labor Market Chang-
es Have Generated Inequality and Wage Suppression?, ECON. POLICY INST. (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/what-labor-market-changes-have-generated-inequality-and-
wage-suppression-employer-power-is-significant-but-largely-constant-whereas-workers-pow 
er-has-been-eroded-by-policy-actions/ [https://perma.cc/CZK3-TE7R]. 
77  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA), 493 U.S. 411, 421 
(1990). 
78  Eduardo Munoz, ‘It’s the New Slavery’: NYC Cab Driver Blasts Uber, City Officials in 
Suicide Note, RT U.S. NEWS (last edited Mar. 21, 2018, 11:37 AM), https://www.rt.com/usa/ 
418352-schifter-suicide-ny-driver-uber/ [https://perma.cc/EQ5X-GGP7]. 
79  UCLA INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP’T ET AL., MORE THAN A GIG: A SURVEY OF 
RIDE-HAILING DRIVERS IN LOS ANGELES (May 2018), https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wp-content 
/uploads/2018/06/Final-Report.-UCLA-More-than-a-Gig.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPZ6-NFJG 
]; Alexa Noel, Revised MIT Study Says Uber, Lyft Drivers Make About $8 or $10 per Hour, 
POINTS GUY (Mar. 8, 2018), https://thepointsguy.com/2018/03/revised-mit-study-says-uber-
lyft-drivers-make-about-8-or-10-per-hour/ [https://perma.cc/3BNQ-KF38]. 
80  Chantel McGee, Only 4% of Uber Drivers Remain on the Platform a Year Later, Says 
Report, CNBC.COM (Apr. 20, 2017, 4:11 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/20/only-4-per 
cent-of-uber-drivers-remain-after-a-year-says-report.html?view=story&%24DEVICE%24=n 
ative-android-mobile [https://perma.cc/FK8J-DYUH]. 
81  Maya Kosoff, Why Uber Drivers Say They Just Can’t Quit Working for the Company, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2014, 3:17 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/why-uber-drivers-j 
ust-cant-quit-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/6DSD-S24E]. 
82  Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
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employer, and then quit before the agreed-upon term of service had ended.83 
The Court held that this law, which created a presumption that the quitting 
worker had defrauded the employer, violated the Thirteenth Amendment. The 
Court declared that the intention of the Thirteenth Amendment was “to make 
labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man 
is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit, which is the essence of involun-
tary servitude.”84 The Court added that the goal of the Thirteenth Amendment 
was to be “a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, 
color, or estate, under the flag.”85 
Over thirty years later, the Court in Pollock v. Williams86 struck down a 
similar statute under the Thirteenth Amendment, and reiterated that the aim of 
the Thirteenth Amendment “was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a 
system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States.”87 
In the key passage, the Court declared that: 
[I]n general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or 
treatment is the right to change employers. When the master can compel and the 
laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress 
and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome condi-
tions of work. Resulting depression of working conditions and living standards 
affects not only the laborer under the system, but every other with whom his la-
bor comes in competition.88 
It is important to consider the different elements of the Court’s holdings in 
these two landmark cases: 
1) The Thirteenth Amendment is not limited to ending or eliminating 
slavery. 
2) The Thirteenth Amendment requires that the United States have a 
system of free labor and does not only create an individual right. 
3) Critical to the creation and enforcement of a free-labor system is the 
right of workers to leave work. 
4) That right is critical not only because the right to leave enables the 
worker who quits to escape oppressive working conditions. The 
right is also critical because it creates power or pressure on the 
boss to respect the demands and needs of the workers. 
5) That power or pressure reverberates throughout a labor market to 
the benefit of all workers who might be competing for work. 
All of these principles come into play when workers who are selling their 
own labor to an entity, be it the government or a private business, collectively 
withhold or refuse their labor. Under these principles, the Thirteenth Amend-
                                                        
83  Id. at 230, 245. 
84  Id. at 241. 
85  Id. at 240–41. 
86  Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
87  Id. at 17, 25. 
88  Id. at 18. 
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ment mandates that such workers participate in a free-labor system. For the la-
bor system in which they work to be a free-labor system, these workers must 
have the right to withhold their labor. That right is not only critical to their own 
ability to escape exploitative conditions. It is also critical to ensuring that the 
labor system is free by ensuring that all the sellers of labor in a particular mar-
ket be in a position to pressure the labor purchaser to provide work conditions 
that do not constitute a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions. 
Bailey and Pollock both directly address the right of an individual to quit a 
job without being criminally prosecuted.89 Recently, a court specifically upheld 
the right to quit a job collectively under the Thirteenth Amendment. In Vinluan 
v. Doyle, a New York State appellate court issued a writ of prohibition enjoin-
ing the trial judge and prosecutor from proceeding with the criminal prosecu-
tion of a group of ten nurses who had quit their jobs at a nursing home together 
after unsuccessfully protesting harsh labor conditions.90 The indictment alleged 
that they had conspired with their lawyer to endanger the disabled residents of 
the nursing home.91 The trial court earlier rejected a Thirteenth Amendment 
challenge to the prosecution, holding that while an individual nurse might have 
the right to quit, the fact that the nurses had acted “together with forethought 
and planning” made their action a legitimate target of prosecution.92 The appel-
late court, in contrast, held that the collective resignation was protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment.93 
The logic of Bailey, Pollack, and Vinluan applies, with at least equal force, 
to the right to refuse to accept work. If workers’ ability to get out of abusive 
labor relationships is necessary to create a system of free labor, then the ability 
to stay out of such a relationship in the first place is an equally necessary com-
ponent of free labor. 
History also supports this understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
commitment to free labor. In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, south-
ern states enacted what are known as Black Codes attempting to preserve the 
                                                        
89  The Court’s subsequent decision in WERB contains important dicta on the question of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s applicability to collective work stoppages. Int’l Union v. Wiscon-
sin Emp’t Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 247–48 (1949). In that case, the Court rejected a 
Thirteenth-Amendment challenge to a cease and desist order against a union conducting in-
termittent and unannounced work stoppages. Id. at 264–65. However, in so ruling, the Court 
noted that “nothing in the statute or the order makes it a crime to abandon work individually, 
compare Pollock v. Williams [] or collectively.” Id. at 251 (citation omitted). In other words, 
the Court implicitly recognized that collectively abandoning work is constitutionally protect-
ed, at least from prosecution. For a more detailed discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
applicability to collective work stoppages, see generally Richard Blum, “They Outlawed Sol-
idarity!”, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 983 (2016). 
90  Vinluan v. Doyle, 873 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74–75 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). The author discloses 
that he participated in the Vinluan litigation. 
91  Id. at 74. 
92  Indictment at 2, People v. Vinluan, 873 N.Y.S.2d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (No. 
00769A-2007). 
93  Vinluan, 873 N.Y.S.2d at 75. 
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political, social, legal, and above all, labor relationships that whites had en-
joyed over blacks before the war and the enactment of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.94 Central to that project were laws against vagrancy.95 These laws crimi-
nalized unemployment by blacks who refused to accept the coercive labor 
relations that whites, particularly plantation owners, sought to preserve.96 At 
times, the vagrancy laws specifically targeted collective action to refuse work.97 
As documented by the great historian of Reconstruction, Eric Foner, for exam-
ple, “Virginia attempted to outlaw collective action for higher pay by including 
within the definition of vagrancy those who refused to work for ‘the usual and 
common wages given to other laborers.’ ”98 Reconstruction military authorities 
overturned this and other vagrancy statutes as attempts to reestablish slavery.99 
These anti-vagrancy measures were seen as inconsistent with the “principles of 
the free labor ideology.”100 
In the immediate aftermath of the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and the end of the Civil War, newly-freed black workers used collective refus-
als to sign labor contracts as one of a variety of means to protest bad working 
conditions.101 Often spurred on by the Union League, a political organization 
affiliated with the Radical Republicans, former slaves in Alabama and Missis-
sippi, for example, repeatedly responded to oppressive working conditions on 
plantations by boycotting and striking particular owners, among other ac-
tions.102 These organized collective actions had an impact on planters through-
out the region and helped create what the former slaves regarded as a freer la-
bor system.103 At the time of that collective labor disruption, the NLRA’s 
distinction between employee and independent contractor for purposes of col-
lective bargaining remained many decades away and held no relevance to the 
former slaves or their allies or opponents who were fighting, literally on the 
ground, over the significance of the Thirteenth Amendment. What was relevant 
to these pitched battles over the meaning and practice of free labor was the abil-
                                                        
94  ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 199 
(Perennial Library ed. 1989). 
95  Id. at 199–200. 
96  Id. at 200. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. at 209. 
100  Id. at 208. 
101  See MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, THE UNION LEAGUE MOVEMENT IN THE DEEP SOUTH 144–
47 (1989). 
102  Id. at 136–37, 141, 145, 176. 
103  Fitzgerald argues that the former slaves’ labor activism in conjunction with the activities 
of the Union League helped bring about a decentralized tenancy system under which black 
agricultural workers initially had greater autonomy than under the plantation system that the 
planters had hoped to preserve. Id. at 159–60. That the tenancy system developed into an 
oppressive sharecropping system highlights the argument that workers’ formal independence 
is not sufficient to create a truly free labor system. 
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ity of the newly freed slaves to refuse collectively to sell their labor as a means 
of creating a freer labor system. 
Even the narrowest approach to the free labor ideology of the nineteenth 
century would have defended the right to refuse work. The laissez-faire liberal-
ism behind court decisions striking down protective labor legislation on the 
grounds that it interfered with the freedom of contract relied on the notion, 
some would say fiction, that labor contracts were entered into freely. It would 
have been inconsistent with that liberal notion of free labor that flourished in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century for the state to coerce workers into ac-
cepting labor contracts.104 
The opposing approach to free labor in the decades following the Civil War 
assumed a much more radical and robust posture toward collective worker ac-
tion. The radical free labor ideology of “labor republicanism,” perhaps most 
clearly embodied in the positions of the Knights of Labor, would surely have 
defended workers’ right to collectively refuse to accept work, regardless of le-
gal category or the manner in which owners of capital structured the relation-
ship.105 In sum, the right to collectively refuse to take work is deeply embedded 
in this country’s historical understanding of free labor, and is grounded in the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. 
IV. THE SCTLA CASE ANALYZED 
Now, let us take a closer look at the SCTLA decision. In the 1970s and 
1980s, DC met its constitutional obligation to provide free representation to in-
digent criminal defendants through a combination of a Public Defender Service 
(PDS) that took only about 8–10 percent of all cases, usually more serious felo-
nies, and a Criminal Justice Act (CJA) panel of private lawyers, whom the gov-
ernment reimbursed. The CJA lawyers covered about 85 percent of the cases, 
usually less serious felonies and misdemeanors.106 Generally, about 100 of the 
                                                        
104  See ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR 
AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 56–64 (2015). Interestingly, Darrell 
Miller has argued that the Reconstruction Congress’s intervention into the market economy 
to protect the civil rights of newly emancipated people through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
enacted following the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, later helped inspire the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, specifically its intervention into the market economy to address the ex-
cessive power of trusts. Darrell A. H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and 
the History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1036–38 (2008). 
105  GOUREVITCH, supra note 104, at 98–99. As Gourevitch explains, labor republicans saw 
wage labor itself as slavery and advanced a vision of a cooperative commonwealth of inde-
pendent laborers. Id. at 102–03. It is ironic that today, so-called independent contractors are 
so often wage laborers stripped of the labor law protections that developed to respond to 
their lack of bargaining power vis-à-vis capital. It would be bitterly ironic from a labor re-
publican perspective that laws passed to combat trusts are being deployed to prevent workers 
from withholding their labor to gain bargaining power against capital, specifically because 
the workers are not deemed to be wage laborers. 
106  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA), 493 U.S. 411, 
414–15 (1990). 
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1200 lawyers in the CJA panel regularly took most of the cases assigned 
through the CJA system.107 Those lawyers derived most of their income from 
these assignments.108 DC created a Joint Committee on Judicial Administration 
to establish rates for CJA lawyers within the cap set by federal law.109 For sev-
eral years, bar organizations “express[ed] concern about the low fees paid to 
CJA lawyers.”110 Eventually, the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association 
(SCTLA) sought unsuccessfully to convince the DC government to enact legis-
lation raising the rate, despite uniform support.111 The SCTLA formed a strike 
committee and about 100 CJA lawyers voted not to accept more cases after a 
certain date if the rates were not increased.112 
As of September 6, 1983, about 90 percent of the CJA regulars refused to 
accept new assignments.113 The lawyers’ publicity campaign engendered favor-
able responses in the press, although according to the Court, there was no evi-
dence that the favorable publicity generated public pressure or that public pres-
sure caused the rates to be raised.114 As the Court recites the story, the lawyers’ 
“refusal to take new assignments had a severe impact on the District’s criminal 
justice system.”115 The PDS and the CJA lawyers who continued taking cases 
became overwhelmed and the private bar’s response was “feeble.”116 Key lead-
ers of the criminal justice system delivered a letter to the mayor warning that 
the system would “reach a crisis point” by early the following week.117 The 
mayor then offered to raise the rates, the SCTLA voted to accept the offer, the 
City Council enacted the necessary legislation, and on September 21, a few 
weeks after the strike began, the striking lawyers resumed accepting new cases, 
and the crisis subsided.118 
In response to the strike, the FTC filed a complaint against the SCTLA and 
four of its officers claiming that they had “entered into an agreement among 
themselves and with other lawyers to restrain trade by refusing to compete for 
or accept new appointments under the CJA program beginning on September 6, 
1983, unless and until the District of Columbia increased the fees offered under 
the CJA program.”119 The FTC complaint “characterized respondents’ conduct 
                                                        
107  Id. at 415. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 416. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. at 416–17. The Court based its recitation of the facts on the findings of the ALJ, as 
affirmed by the FTC. Id. at 418–19. As discussed below, the SCTLA and the individual re-
spondents, in their briefs to the Court, advanced a different interpretation of events. 
115  Id. at 417. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. at 418. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. (quoting the FTC’s complaint against SCTLA). 
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as ‘a conspiracy to fix prices and to conduct a boycott’ and concluded that they 
were engaged in ‘unfair methods of competition in violation of . . .’ ”120 anti-
trust law.121 
An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing, found that the 
facts alleged had been proved, and rejected the respondents’ defenses.122 “The 
ALJ nevertheless concluded that the complaint should be dismissed because . . . 
[the] net effect [of the strike] was beneficial” because the fee increase would 
increase the supply of lawyers in the CJA system, thus increasing competition 
and yielding better representation.123 The FTC reversed the ALJ, “noting that 
the boycott forced the city government to increase the CJA fees from a level 
that had been sufficient to obtain an adequate supply of CJA lawyers to a level 
satisfactory to the respondents.”124 In short, the FTC concluded that the law-
yers’ refusal to accept new assignments had not only been an unlawful conspir-
acy to fix prices, but had also resulted in the lawyers’ reaping a premium above 
what the market supposedly would have yielded if left to its own devices. As a 
remedy, the FTC issued a cease and desist order prohibiting the SCTLA and its 
leadership from engaging in various boycott-related activities, compelling 
SCTLA to notify its members of the FTC’s decision, and imposing on the indi-
vidual lawyers a duty to notify the FTC of changes in the nature of their legal 
practice for five years.125 
On appeal, the circuit court of appeals agreed that the SCTLA and its lead-
ers had violated the antitrust law and rejected their First Amendment arguments 
based on Claiborne Hardware and Noerr.126 It also rejected the argument that 
the boycott was justified because it sought to improve the quality of representa-
tion.127 However, that court found that the boycott contained an element of ex-
pression.128 Applying the Supreme Court’s rule for protecting First Amendment 
expression embedded in unlawful conduct,129 the circuit court held that the FTC 
should have had to prove, rather than presume, that the SCTLA had sufficient 
market power for its actions to have had a market impact.130 
                                                        
120  Id. (quoting the FTC’s complaint against SCTLA). 
121  Id. at 419. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. 
124  Id (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125  Id. at 420. 
126  See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n (SCTLA), 856 F.2d 226, 
233–47 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
127  Id. at 243–48. 
128  Id. at 248. 
129  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). 
130  SCTLA, 856 F.2d at 250. Antitrust law distinguishes between per se violations, such as 
price fixing, for which bad market impact is ordinarily presumed, and other violations for 
which the complaining party must prove under the “Rule of Reason” that the conduct com-
plained of had an adverse market impact under the principles of antitrust law. See id. at 249. 
19 NEV. L.J. 365, BLUM 4/8/2019  1:21 PM 
386 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2  
 
In their briefs to the Supreme Court, the SCTLA argued that the strike was 
a political act; a well-publicized petitioning of the legislature protected under 
Noerr.131 The lawyers’ organization argued that the strike gave political cover 
to the government officials responsible for enacting the raise to do what they 
wanted to do anyway without political risk.132 They also argued, inter alia, that, 
although it was not necessary to reach the issue, the striking lawyers lacked 
market power, and the boycott was not economically coercive.133 In short, the 
SCTLA strategy was to claim that the strike served as a piece of political thea-
ter to facilitate political actions by the government, rather than a genuinely 
economically coercive tactic that succeeded by inducing a crisis.134 
The individual lawyers also emphasized the political nature of the boycott 
and its antecedents in United States history.135 In contrast to possible conspira-
cies by other sellers of goods or services to the government, the lawyers in this 
case were acting openly in order to affect the legislative process through public 
pressure, not economic coercion. The City Council retained various political 
options in responses to the strike, including a public relations campaign against 
the SCTLA or providing additional funding to the PDS.136 In sum, the primary 
defense strategy was to distinguish between political and economic pressure, 
asserting First Amendment protection for the former. 
The Supreme Court rejected all of the proposed defenses. It analyzed the 
case as a simple example of price fixing, and therefore, as a per se violation of 
the antitrust law.137 The Court was willing to assume that the boycott served a 
worthwhile cause, that pre-boycott rates were unreasonably low, that the in-
crease resulted in improved representation for indigent criminal defendants, and 
that given the lack of political power of both the criminal defendants and their 
lawyers, the increase would not have happened absent the boycott.138 Neverthe-
less, the Court held that the antitrust laws prohibited the boycott and that the 
First Amendment did not protect it.139 
The Court distinguished Noerr by making a distinction between petitioning 
the government with the goal of generating anticompetitive legislation, and us-
                                                        
131  Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 3, 
at 21–22. 
132  Id. at 22. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 24. In arguing that their actions were not coercive, the SCTLA even argued that the 
crisis was not real, in particular, that the PDS, in sympathy, refrained from seeking help in 
covering cases that was available through the private bar. Id. at 41. Moreover, during the 
strike, the court could have ordered the lawyers to accept cases, a peculiar wrinkle that raises 
interesting questions under the Thirteenth Amendment, discussed below. Id. at 29. 
135  Brief of the Individual Respondents at 35–36, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Tri-
al Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (Nos. 88-1198, 88-1393), 1989 WL 1126840. 
136  Id. at 28. 
137  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA), 493 U.S. 411, 422 
(1990). 
138  Id. at 421. 
139  Id. at 422–32. 
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ing the means of anticompetitive actions to accomplish a legislative goal. Using 
a boycott as the means to accomplish its legislative ends was not protected by 
Noerr.140 
The Court also distinguished the lawyers’ boycott from the boycott of the 
civil rights demonstrators in Claiborne Hardware. The Court acknowledged 
that it had held in Claiborne Hardware that the “right of the States to regulate 
economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, 
politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic 
change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.”141 How-
ever, the Court found that the boycotters in that case “sought no special ad-
vantage for themselves.”142 In contrast, the SCTLA boycotters sought a raise in 
pay for themselves, no matter how altruistic their motives may have been.143 In 
short, the self-interested economic goal of the lawyers’ boycott took it out from 
under the protection of the First Amendment. In contrast, I argue that the Thir-
teenth Amendment protects self-interested labor boycotts as a coercive tactic 
that is necessary to ensuring a system of free labor. 
V. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF WORKERS TO BOYCOTT 
A. The Constitutional Right of Workers to Act Collectively in Their Self-
Interest 
Whichever way the lawyers in the SCTLA case described their action, they 
were withholding or refusing to sell their labor to the court system in order to 
induce the government to address what they regarded as unconscionable rates. 
As mentioned above, the SCTLA Court tried to distinguish the lawyers’ boycott 
from the one in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, by asserting that the civil 
rights boycott was somehow selfless.144 Of course, that assertion mischaracter-
izes the civil rights boycott at issue, which unabashedly sought to open eco-
nomic access to the community conducting the boycott.145 More ironically, it 
inexplicably devalues the lawyers’ convincing argument that they were seeking 
to vindicate the constitutional rights of their clients who, as a practical matter, 
had no power to pressure the courts to increase the rates. But from a Thirteenth 
Amendment perspective, this argument is also wrong because it overlooks the 
                                                        
140  Id. at 424–25. 
141  Id. at 426 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 914 (1982)). 
142  Id. Indeed, Claiborne Hardware itself suggests that economic boycotts are less protected 
than by the First Amendment than political boycotts. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 
458 U.S. 886, 912–13 (1982). For a critique of the Claiborne Hardware distinction between 
political and economic protest, see Blum, supra note 15, at 606–08. 
143  SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 427. Interestingly, The SCTLA brief notes that one of the leaders of 
the boycott was already preparing to end her CJA practice and thus had nothing to gain by 
helping to organize the strike. She acted out of political conviction. Brief for Respond-
ent/Cross-Petitioner Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
144  SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 426; see also supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
145  Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 899. 
19 NEV. L.J. 365, BLUM 4/8/2019  1:21 PM 
388 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2  
 
critical significance of self-interested action, specifically the withholding of la-
bor, to establish and preserve a system of free labor. 
The argument that a boycott must be selfless to be constitutionally protect-
ed misses the point that workers have a constitutional right to assert their own 
interests. As the Pollock Court articulated, it is only by doing so that they can 
attain for themselves and for others in the same labor market the right to labor 
freely.146 In other words, even though the First Amendment distinguishes be-
tween expressions on matters of public and private concern, the Thirteenth 
Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, recognizes that to have a 
system of free labor, workers need to be able to act in their own interest. The 
fact that the lawyers in the SCTLA case may have acted out of both self-interest 
and concern for their clients, just as the members of my public defenders’ union 
did when they went on strike, should not have affected whether the Thirteenth 
Amendment protected them from legal sanction. 
Accordingly, when the government is setting the price of labor, the First 
Amendment does not define the outer limits of what protest activity to pressure 
the rate setter is protected. The way the SCTLA Court distinguished the Noerr 
decision may or may not be defensible as a matter of First Amendment doc-
trine, but it does not address the Thirteenth Amendment’s unique protection of 
labor and specifically, its protection of the right to withdraw or withhold labor. 
Because boycotting a purchaser is generally prohibited under antitrust law, ar-
guably, it can be prohibited as a means of expression under the First Amend-
ment. However, a boycott by sellers of labor should still enjoy protection as a 
method of protest under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Even if the price of labor is considered a market factor subject to antitrust 
regulation, it is a factor that differs qualitatively and constitutionally from other 
market factors, such as commodity prices. The mandate of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, as described by the Bailey and Pollock Courts, requires that labor 
be treated differently from commodities, and defends the ability of sellers of 
labor to take action to protect their rights in ways that sellers of commodities do 
not enjoy. Specifically, withholding labor to get the government or other rate 
setter to fix a better price is not only permissible, but protected. 
The Clayton Act recognized the critical distinction between labor and 
commodities.147 As set forth above, early on, the Court chose to ignore that 
statutory distinction. Eventually, in light of congressional action to protect la-
bor, both in the Norris-LaGuardia Acts and the NLRA, the Court came to re-
spect that collective labor action to improve the terms and conditions of work 
was to be treated differently from collectively action to affect commodity pric-
es.148 But regardless of congressional action through labor statutes, or courts’ 
willingness to honor that congressional action, the Thirteenth Amendment de-
                                                        
146  Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17–18 (1944); see also supra notes 88–90 and accom-
panying text. 
147  See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). 
148  See supra Part I. 
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mands that workers should have power to challenge the unilateral setting of the 
price of their labor.149 
In making this argument, I am not seeking to define precisely the contours 
of boycotts that are protected under the Thirteenth Amendment.150 In general, 
my argument concerns boycotts by sellers of their own labor, recognizing that 
they may also have some staff supporting their work, such as secretaries and 
paralegals. Or, that they may have made some capital investments in their 
work, such as the purchase or leasing of cars.151 The Thirteenth Amendment 
analysis would have to focus on whether the seller is primarily selling her own 
labor, even if supported by some staff or capital investment.152 At some point, a 
firm providing selling services can no longer claim Thirteenth Amendment pro-
tection against antitrust law. If New York City’s major corporate firms colluded 
to set minimum rates for services to the City, they would not be able to invoke 
the Thirteenth Amendment, even though the partners are selling their own la-
bor. Moreover, the collective boycott would have to address the terms and con-
ditions of the sale of labor and not serve as a stalking horse for one business 
competitor versus another, a distinction that antitrust law already applies to un-
ion activity.153 Although there may be difficult cases for drawing the line, these 
cases do not negate the constitutional protections for those who would satisfy 
                                                        
149  As James Pope has reminded us, Congress enacted the NLRA under its power to regulate 
interstate commerce, not under the Thirteenth Amendment. James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth 
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitu-
tional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002). Thus, the NLRA does not even 
purport to define the scope of worker rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
150  Antitrust experts have offered arguments on where to draw lines under antitrust law to 
protect small-scale market participants against monopsonies and oligopsonies. See, e.g., 
Grimes, supra note 74, at 196–97. A monopsony is a market with only one buyer, which 
gives great control over pricing. Monopsony, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/ 
monopsony/ [https://perma.cc/H349-2JQA] (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). Similarly, oligopso-
ny is a market with only a few buyers, again giving them great control over pricing. See Oli-
gopsony, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/oligopsony/ [https://perma.cc/54DP 
-V3BX] (last visited on Oct. 31, 2018). Such arguments concern the goals of antitrust law, 
not the constitutional guarantee of a free labor system. The extreme and increasingly preva-
lent market conditions they address simply illustrate the applicability to today’s labor con-
flicts of my constitutional argument for the right to refuse labor in order to enhance workers’ 
bargaining power. See Steinbaum, supra note 76. That constitutional argument is distinct 
from those based on market failures and economic efficiency or other economic principles 
under antitrust law, even though both types of argument may, at times, be responding to sig-
nificant imbalances in bargaining power. 
151  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Samuel Estreicher in Support of Defendants-
Appellees City of Seattle et al., supra note 74, at 4–5. 
152  The cost of a worker’s capital investments seems an arbitrary measure of whether the 
worker is still selling his or her own labor. The tools of one trade may just happen to be more 
expensive than the tools of another trade. That difference in cost should be irrelevant to the 
constitutional question presented here. 
153  Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 807–10 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 
312 U.S. 219, 231–33 (1941). 
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any normal definition of worker, regardless of where labor statutes draw their 
lines.154 
Adapting the SCTLA dissent, one could argue that relative market power 
should be considered in determining if a collective refusal to accept work 
should be protected under the Thirteenth Amendment. According to that ap-
proach, if a group of independent contractors already possesses disproportion-
ate bargaining power against potential purchasers of their labor, perhaps be-
cause of a high level of unusual skills, the contractors should not be 
constitutionally protected. After all, some sellers of labor would not need addi-
tional power from below or incentives from above to prevent exploitative 
working conditions. Indeed, the metaphors of above and below might not even 
apply in some instances. However, this proposal does not readily suggest a de-
finable metric for determining what constitutes too much market or bargaining 
power. My argument is that sellers of labor, however they are statutorily classi-
fied, are constitutionally entitled to withhold their labor collectively in order to 
impact the market in anti-competitive ways. There is no obvious market or non-
market metric to determine when that impact is too great.155 
We do not apply that limiting principle to workers who are employees un-
der the NLRA. In contrast, we have accepted the principle that employees may 
withhold their labor from their employers and we have left the results to the re-
spective power of striking workers and their employers.156 Consequently, some 
very well-paid highly-skilled employees, such as professional athletes, have the 
statutory right to withhold their labor collectively to gain even higher pay, albe-
it in contests against very powerful foes. The NLRA offers no way to determine 
when these employees have too much power or have been too successful to jus-
tify the results, even when critical services, such as health care, are at issue.157 
                                                        
154  Harris and Krueger’s proposal of a third category of independent worker, does not re-
solve the problem of drawing a constitutional line, although it might arguably result in some 
greater protections from antitrust law for worker collective action where those workers 
would otherwise be classified as independent contractors. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 
70, at 15. First, the proposal might primarily result in reclassifying workers who, arguably, 
should be regarded as employees under current law, including Uber and Lyft drivers. Sec-
ond, the proposal might not benefit genuine independent contractors, like the lawyers in the 
SCTLA case, who should still be able to withhold their labor collectively to improve the 
terms and conditions of their work. 
155  See James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law 
of “Involuntary Servitude”, 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1550–51 (2010) (countering arguments 
“that workers gain disproportionate power through concerted” strike activity). 
156  The NLRA, as interpreted by the Board and the courts, curtails union power in various 
ways, for example, by permitting permanent replacements under certain circumstances dur-
ing a strike. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). But the law 
permits workers protected by the NLRA to collectively withhold their labor regardless of 
their power relative to the employer. Id. at 347. 
157  The NLRA does impose some procedural restrictions on the right to strike, including a 
notice requirement specific to the health care industry. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), (g) (2012). The 
reasonableness or constitutionality of these restrictions is beyond the scope of this article. In 
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As with employees whose right to strike is statutorily protected, public policy 
may raise questions about whether existing markets present the best way to 
provide various services or goods, but curtailing the constitutional right to 
withhold labor should generally not be the answer to those questions. 
In response to concerns that the Thirteenth Amendment right for which I 
am arguing may go too far, I would propose that the best approach, particularly 
in the absence of targeted legislation, is to apply strict scrutiny, rather than a 
predefined absolute line, to any attempt to restrict collective refusals to sell la-
bor. That judicial analysis would demand proof of a compelling public reason, 
such as health and safety, to limit the right to collectively refuse labor. General 
principles of market efficiency or competition would not suffice. If the pur-
chaser of labor can prove that a compelling public interest exists, then the next 
inquiry is whether the restriction is sufficiently narrowly tailored not to impede 
the constitutional right any more than necessary to protect the compelling pub-
lic interest. Any penalty that chills activity under the general rule is not suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored. Given the history of judicial hostility to collective 
worker action, specifically through application of antitrust law, and given the 
litigation costs required to defend against antitrust claims, it is important to 
frame this possible exception through strict scrutiny to emphasize how difficult 
it should be to curtail this right and to discourage litigation that might seek to 
curtail it. 
B. The Thirteenth Amendment Right to Withhold Labor v. Market Logic 
Just as the Thirteenth Amendment free labor mandate is not circumscribed 
by labor statutes, it is also not limited to the market logic of antitrust law. In 
SCTLA, the Supreme Court used a market lens to find the lawyers’ boycott to 
be unlawful. The Court characterized the lawyers as competitors whose indi-
vidual decisions to enter or exit from the relevant labor market would guide the 
government rate setter. By colluding or conspiring to exit the market together 
for a period of time, the lawyers were disrupting the proper functioning of these 
market signals, which might have permitted the government to continue to pay 
at a lower rate. Individual lawyers who found the rates were too low could have 
left the system until the rates were raised. If enough individual lawyers decided 
to exit, the government would have had to raise the rates. But if enough lawyers 
stayed in the system or entered the system under existing rates, those rates 
would be properly treated as the correct market rates. By acting collectively or 
with collective intent, the lawyers obtained a higher rate than the market might 
have borne. 
Even the market reasoning of this position is flawed for two reasons. First, 
the ultimate consumers of the service in question, the criminal defendants, had 
no voice in the market. As long as the court system did not rule that they were 
                                                                                                                                
any event, they stand in marked contrast to the blunderbuss and market-driven prohibition on 
labor boycotts under the antitrust laws. 
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receiving constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, they had no way of 
making the government pay for them to get better representation. Second, as 
the lawyers argued to the Court,158 and as the FTC’s ALJ found,159 the in-
creased rates actually brought more lawyers into the system and increased the 
pool of competitors. By cutting off any examination of market impact of the 
boycott in treating the violation as per se, the Court precluded proof that they 
lawyers’ action may have actually enhanced labor market competition, con-
sistent with the goals of the antitrust laws. But even without these flaws in the 
Court’s reasoning, I argue that the Thirteenth Amendment does not permit the 
law to raise the market and its logic above the mandate for a free labor system 
that includes the right to withhold labor. The error of the SCTLA Court was not 
in refusing to consider market impact, but in not setting aside its statutory con-
cern for the market in favor of a constitutional mandate concerning the freedom 
of labor. As seen in the language of both Pollock and Bailey, the Thirteenth 
Amendment is not neutral between markets concerns and free labor when they 
are at odds.160 The Thirteenth Amendment sides with labor and demands that 
the sellers of labor have the ability to withhold their labor to ensure that when it 
is sold, it is sold freely. 
Pollock, in particular, establishes the principle that withholding labor is 
necessary for workers to have sufficient power to create an incentive for those 
who are purchasing their labor not to impose “a harsh overlordship or unwhole-
some conditions.”161 The history and logic of the Thirteenth Amendment, as 
interpreted in Bailey and Pollock, requires that people who are selling their la-
bor power be able to withhold that labor before or after accepting work, and 
whether individually or collectively, to have sufficient power to act freely as 
laborers. These principles must apply regardless of the market logic embedded 
in antitrust law. 
Someone taking a market approach might argue that the use of antitrust law 
against labor boycotts by independent contractors can be consistent with the 
Thirteenth Amendment rights of those workers to refuse work. For example, 
one could argue that the rights of independent contractors could be vindicated 
as long as they are free to act individually as labor market actors, but without 
the right to conspire to pressure the purchaser or regulator of their labor. If the 
market is left to work, as antitrust law arguably envisions, the free labor system 
is protected, or so goes the argument. 
There may be circumstances in which labor markets function consistently 
with the mandate of a free labor system. However, there is nothing in the Thir-
teenth Amendment or the decisional law establishing the right to withhold labor 
                                                        
158  Brief of the Individual Respondents, supra note 135, at 38. 
159  See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA), 493 U.S. 411, 
419 (1990). 
160  Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17–18 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 
(1911). 
161  Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18. 
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that justifies limiting that right according to market methods or goals. Pollock 
and Bailey squarely endorse the method of withholding labor to gain bargaining 
power and the goal of a free labor system. Neither the logic or the history de-
scribed above would justify circumscribing that method or that goal based on 
market principles.162 
As argued above, the logic of Bailey and Pollock shows the need to protect 
collective refusals to withhold labor, and the language of the WERB decision 
confirms that understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment.163 Moreover, the 
Reconstruction response to vagrancy laws that sought to stop collective actions 
by freed slaves to refuse work demonstrates that the right to withhold labor col-
lectively is embedded in the earliest history and implementation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. 
Another market-based approach to labor conflict might be to argue that the 
lawyers in SCTLA had the option to leave the assignment system permanently 
without declaring a temporary boycott to pressure the government. If they had 
all just left the system, the market would have forced the government to re-
spond to the shortage, and their Thirteenth Amendment right to withhold labor 
would have been vindicated. Assuming it is true that they were free to leave the 
court’s assignment system, and that there was no obligation for criminal de-
fense practitioners to take such cases unless ordered to so by the court sys-
tem,164 I argue that the distinction between refusal to accept new cases tempo-
rarily in the form of a boycott, on the one hand, and permanently leaving the 
assignment system, on the other, is one without a constitutionally relevant dif-
ference. 
The decisions in Bailey and Pollock do not limit the rationale for why the 
Thirteenth Amendment protects the right to quit to the right to sever ties per-
                                                        
162  See Pope, supra note 155, at 1548–49 (arguing that Bailey and Pollock should be applied 
to nonmarket rights). 
163  Int’l Union v. Wisconsin Emp’t Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 251 (1949). 
164  As noted above, a peculiar twist in the SCTLA case is that the strikers acknowledged that 
the local court system had the authority to order members of the bar to take cases, so it could 
have ended the strike coercively. See Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 3, at 15. As officers of the court, the conduct of lawyers is 
heavily regulated to a degree that the conduct of other workers, even that of drivers, is not. 
Being admitted to the bar includes acceptance of certain social responsibilities. Moreover, 
the courts have recognized certain forms of state conscription as permissible, notwithstand-
ing the Thirteenth Amendment, for example, military conscription, jury duty, and even pub-
lic road work. See generally Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); Butler v. Perry, 
240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916). However, for most independent contractors in the private sector, 
these historical exceptions for certain types of public service do not apply to their work. Nei-
ther FedEx nor Uber enjoys the authority to conscript its workers. Moreover, the argument 
here concerns the application of antitrust law to stop or prevent labor boycotts, specifically 
the attempt at coercive economic regulation to prohibit the withholding of labor. The ability 
of the court system to order lawyers admitted to the bar to meet a constitutional need for rep-
resentation of criminal defendants is simply irrelevant to whether the government may regu-
late the economy by taking away the right to withhold labor as a weapon in economic war-
fare over the terms and conditions under which that labor is sold. 
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manently. Indeed, quitting can be temporary, particularly in an independent 
contractor context. An independent contractor can tell a purchaser of their labor 
that they will no longer do business with that purchaser, and then change their 
mind later on when offered more money. 
The lawyers involved in the boycott could have all resigned from the as-
signment system en masse until the rates went up. It is hard to see a constitu-
tionally relevant distinction between that action, and the action they took. Ei-
ther way, the lawyers would have collectively withdrawn their labor from the 
system to pressure the court to raise its rates. If they had all said they were 
leaving the assignment system, the court system might not have known whether 
they would return if the rates went up. In the action the lawyers actually took, 
the court system had more reason to believe that they would return. But that 
level of uncertainty about the future should have no bearing on the application 
of the Bailey or Pollock principles. Either way, these workers would be with-
holding their labor to pressure the purchaser of that labor to improve terms and 
conditions of work. The Thirteenth Amendment does not require that workers 
be coy about their intentions when protesting unjust working conditions, in-
cluding low pay. 
Nor does the First Amendment permit the government to base its punitive 
enforcement actions on how clearly the workers articulate their intentions and 
goals, punishing only those who express the meaning of their collective action 
more overtly.165 Specifically, it would be an instance of prohibited viewpoint 
discrimination to say that workers are permitted to collectively withdraw from 
a labor market without declaring their intention to see rates go up, but that they 
will be punished if they attach an expression of intention to that action.166 
In sum, the Thirteenth Amendment should protect labor boycotts like the 
one in SCTLA as much as the collective or mass individual withdrawal from a 
labor assignment system. The Thirteenth Amendment should protect the trial 
lawyers’ association’s assertion of a boycott on future cases as much as it un-
questionably would have protected mass resignation from the case assignment 
panel. This argument applies equally to Uber drivers, for example.167 It should 
not matter constitutionally whether they collectively withhold their labor by 
leaving Uber altogether until terms and conditions of the work improve suffi-
ciently, or by announcing a collective boycott until their goals are met. 
                                                        
165  See Blum, supra note 89, at 1005–06. 
166  See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (ordinance in cross-
burning case stricken as facially unconstitutional under First Amendment because it imposes 
special prohibitions on speakers who express views on disfavored subjects and includes 
viewpoint discrimination). 
167  In the professional context, the same principle would apply to individual doctors or other 
health care providers who participate in Medicaid or Medicare or any other insurance net-
works. They should be able to collectively boycott an insurance provider to raise reimburse-
ment rates. The government or insurance company may respond in various ways, but the 
right of the provider of the medical services to withhold that labor is constitutionally protect-
ed. 
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I noted above the irony that the Supreme Court’s approach to antitrust law 
would protect a wealthy corporation that controls a labor market against collec-
tive attempts by workers with little or no bargaining power to band together to 
gain some of that power.168 It is particularly ironic to consider that if Uber were 
purchasing labor power from a company that employed some large number of 
drivers directly, there would be no per se antitrust prohibition against that sup-
plier company using its market power to exact better prices from Uber. 
Where hundreds of public defenders are employed by one entity, that entity 
is entitled to use its unique position to bargain with the City over rates without 
any fear of antitrust law. If this entity rejected the City’s last best offer of a 
contract, and chose not to provide the labor until the City raised its rates, it 
would not be colluding with anyone; it would just be using its own market 
power, or, perhaps, political power. It is precisely because the lawyers in 
SCTLA were each self-employed and had no bargaining power on their own, 
that the antitrust law deprived them of the opportunity to act collectively. 
This approach to regulating the sale and purchase of labor stands the man-
date and principles of the Thirteenth Amendment on their head. As discussed 
above, the Thirteenth Amendment’s right to withhold labor is premised on the 
need for those without bargaining power over their labor to gain enough power 
to prevent exploitation. Individual workers outside of corporate structures are 
entitled to the highest degree of solicitude under the Thirteenth Amendment, 
including protection of their right to act collectively with one another to with-
hold labor. It simply cannot be that, under the Thirteenth Amendment, a corpo-
ration can legally withhold services when groups of individual workers acting 
in concert are prohibited from doing so. 
CONCLUSION 
As creative fissuring of the workplace and the gig economy generate more 
challenges to statutory classifications, it is incumbent on the courts to enforce 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s overarching guarantee of a system of free labor, 
and of its protection of the refusal or withholding of labor as a means to ensure 
that system for all workers. 
In regulating labor conflict, we are accustomed to looking to statutory rules 
and, sometimes, the First Amendment right to free speech. The mandate of the 
Thirteenth Amendment is too often overlooked. But the Thirteenth Amendment 
should serve as the foundation for jurisprudence concerning the withholding of 
labor whether by quitting one’s job or striking, or in forms, such as a labor 
boycott, that are adapted to the contemporary labor market. Laws that regulate 
labor conflict solely to regulate the market should be strictly scrutinized 
through a Thirteenth Amendment lens to determine if their rules or penalties 
chill constitutionally protected activity. That scrutiny requires adjudicators to 
pull back from standard market principles and approaches, and to consider both 
                                                        
168  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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the fundamental right to withhold labor by refusing work and to place a consti-
tutional value on securing the bargaining power of people who are selling their 
labor for a living. That right and that bargaining power should be recognized as 
essential to the mandate that we establish, and maintain a system of free labor 
in the United States. 
